The description of the explicit form of particular vN-M stable sets for special classes of «-person cooperative games is interesting and important from the viewpoint of appliction as well as theory. All discriminatory vN-M stable sets for (n,k) games which were defined by Muto are characterized.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern solution for «-person games usually characterizes many different stable sets for most games, von Neumann and Morgenstern state that, among the several stable sets, the ones which are accepted depend upon "standards of behavior" which are norms, rules or conventions imposed by society. In studying stable sets for «-person games, we can often see that one, or several, of the players always receives the same amount. Such players are said to be disciminated players, and such stable sets are called discriminatory. This concept was introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [7, p. 290] . It is of interest to examine games in which the social standard of discrimination is involved.
The purpose of this paper is to characterize all discriminatory stable sets for any («,/.) game. For any x and y g A and nonempty S c zV, we say x dominates y via S, denoted by xdomy via S or xdomsy, if x, > yi for all i G _> and __,GS.x, < v(S). This latter inequality is referred to as S and is coalition effective for x. We also say x dominates y, denoted by x dorn y, if there is some S such that x dorn y via S. For any B ç A, we define Doms B = {y G A : x dom y via 5 for some x £ B}, Dom Ä = (J Doms B.
S<zN
A subset V of A is said to be a tz/V-A/ _*.a¿>/-set or _.-zW-s.f if and only if V n Dom V = 0 and F U Dom V = A. These two conditions are called internal and external stability, respectively. We say that a coalition S is vital if v(S) > 0.
A game (TV, v) is said to be a symmetric game if V(S) = v(T) whenever |S| = \T\, i.e., whenever S and T contain the same number of players. In this case, we also write v(S) = v(s), where \S\ =» s is the cardinality of S. We say that a symmetric game (N,v) has strongly vital k-person coalitions if v(s) ^ v(k) ■ (s/k) for all k < _ < « and v(s) = 0 for all s < k. The symbol («, k) will be used to denote such games.
To simply the notation let y(S) = £,eS_y, whenever y e. A and the nonempty set S ç TV.
The following theorem was proved by Hart [4] : Theorem 1.1. Consider any (n,k) game. For any x, y g A and any T ç TV, if x dom y via T then there is some S ç TV such that \S\ = k and x dom y via S.
Definition.
A p-discriminatory set, where p is a positive integer, is a set V(ai¡, ah,..., at-, z'" i2,...,ip) = {x g A: xh = a¡k, where ik g TV and 1 < & < p}.
Vp will denote a p-discriminatory set, and _3_ = {/',, z2,..., z'_), i.e., the set of discriminated players in K,. If a p-discriminatory set V is a stable set for the game (N,v), then we will call it a p-discriminatory stable set for (N,v).
Discriminatory stable sets have been determined for several classes of games. Herbert [3] descrsibed the 2-discriminatory stable set for 4-person constant sum games. A necessary and sufficient condition for games to have (« -2)-discriminatory stable sets with discriminated players {3,4,...,«} and a3^ a4^ ■■■ > an was obtained by Owen [5J. Owen [6] has also characterized all occurrences of discrimination for games in which only the 1, (« -1), and «-player coalitions are vital. Weber [9, 10] extended these results to games in which the (« -2)-player coalitions may also be vital and characterized all discriminatory stable sets for (n,k) games with v(k) = 1 and k > n/2.
2. Main theorems. We will now describe discriminatory stable sets for any (n,k) game.
In Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, we will show that if V, is a discriminatory stable set for a game («, k) with v(k) = a, then / = « -k and x(N -Dn_k) < a for each x G V¡.
Theorem 2.1. // V¡ is a discriminatory stable set for an (n,k) game with v(k) = a, then I = « -k.
Proof. Let V, be any /-discriminatory set. The proof will be carried out by reductio ad absurdum. For any y G F,, there are at most n-l<n-(n-k) = k components larger than the corresponding components of x. Therefore, x G Dom F, and V¡ is not a stable set.
(ii) Assume ¿Z'h=xa,■ = 1. V¡ is a one-point set. There exists at least one k g where e, > 0 is small enough such that x¡ -e, > 0 for each z G S. Then y G Yt and x dorn y. Therefore, K, cannot satisfy internal stability. D For an («, n -1) game with v(n -1) = 1, von Neumann and Morgenstern [8] showed that the minimum payoff to the «th player is always less than l/(« -1) for stable sets which are symmetric in just the first « -1 players. In Theorem 2.2, we will show that the minimum payoff to all discriminated players is no less than I -a for an («, k) game with v(k) = a. Theorem 2.2. If Vn_k is a discriminatory set for an (n,k) game with v(k) = a, then x(N -Dn_k) < a for any x G Vn_k.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that x(N -Dn__k) > a. Then 1 -a > x(Dn_k) > 0. Let Y = {y e A\y¡ = a¡ + e for i e Dn_k, where e > 0}. It is easy to see that Y n V" _ h. = 0. Then each y in Y must be dominated by at least one point x in V"_k. From the definition of Y, we can see that y can be dominated by x only via N -Dn_k. However, x(N -Dn_k) > a for each x G V"_k. So, V"^k does not satisfy external stability. D Next, we describe a necessary and sufficient condition for a set Vn_k with x(N -Dn_k) < a for all x g Vn_k to be a stable set for an («, k) game with v(k) = a. In order to do this, we will first introduce a lemma which will be useful later. Consider the inequality system: Proof. For convenience, let S -TV -Dn^k. First, we will prove the internal stability of Vn_k.
Take any x, y G Vn_k. Then x, = y¡ for each / G Dn_k and x(S) = y(S) =1-5. Hence, x cannot dominate y and y cannot dominate x.
To prove external stability, pick any y g A -V"_k. Case 2. y(S) > 1 -5. Since ,KAi-*) = ! _ -K5) < 1 -(1 -«0 -ä there exists an z G Ö"_Ä such that y, < a¡. Otherwise, y, > a,, for each / g D"_k, which implies y¡ = ai for each z g D__a. This violates the assumption that y g A -V"_k. Let /z G D"_k be such that y/, < a/,. We will describe a sufficient condition for the existence of an x g Vn_k such that x dorn jí. where / G S. We can see that __I<ES_(7-} x, + aA < a is equivalent to x7 > 1 -a-/ e d" *-{a} az-Therefore, the only reduced cover of the system can be observed to be (1,1,..., 1) . Using Lemma 2.3, we know that the system Iy is solvable if and only if Y,imS-tj\ y,■ + 1 -a --_/a0 _/A) < 1 -5. We need to have at least one of these k inequality systems hold. That is to say, there exists no y g A -Vn_k with y(S) >l-" such that the following system holds:
We can also see that the first inequality of system II is equivalent to E,eS_{y) y¡ > a -ah for each / G S. There must exist a reduced cover for which condition (2.1) in Lemma 2.3 fails, for otherwise, system II' has a solution. We shall list all reduced covers for system II'.
Let b w denote the component of the reduced cover corresponding to I w. So far, we have obtained a necessary and sufficient condition of system I to have a solution. In order to show that Vn_k dominates any y G A -Vn_k, we need to consider each « g Dn_k. Therefore, a sufficient condition for Vn_k to dominate any y G A -V"_k is that a > [(k -\)/k] + aM.
It remains to prove that a > [(k -\)/k] + aM is also a necessary condition. Let AM= {y&A-V"_k:yM< aM and y, > a, for each / G Dn_k -{M}. It is easy to see that A M & 0. Using the same procedure as in Case 2 of this theorem, we can prove that a necessary and sufficient condition for AMDomVn_k is a > [(/. -l)//c] + aM. Hence, the range of a cannot be extended. We have the desired result. D Thus, we have described all discriminatory stable sets for any («, k) game. Next, we shall give two examples of a discriminatory stable set for («, k) games. Example 1. All discriminatory stable sets for any (3,2) game. If any (3,2) game does have discriminatory stable sets, they must be 1-discriminatory stable sets. W.L.O.G. we assume that player 1 is discriminated. Using Theorem 2.4, we know that any (3,2) game with t;(2) = a = 3/4 + e, where 1/4 > _ > 0, has 1-discriminatory stable sets. Vv = {(yx,x2,_-3) g A\x2 + x3 = 1 -yx}, where y g [1/4 -e, 1/4 + e) (see Figure 2 .1). The triangle represents the set A and the heavy line indicates V.,.
Example 2. All discriminatory stable sets for the (4,2) game with v(2) = 0.8. We know that only 2-discriminatory sets can be discriminatory stable sets for any (4,2) game. W.L.O.G. we assume that players 1 and 2 are discriminated and player 1 gets no less than player 2. Then, Vy¡V2 = {(yx, y2, x3, x4) g A :x3 + x4 = 1 -yx -y2), where yx ^ y2, 0.3 > yx> 0.1, and yx + y2> 0.2 are discriminatory stable sets for this game. 
